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Abstract. Natural-hazard triggered technological accidents
(natechs) at industrial facilities have been recognized as an
emerging risk. Adequate preparedness, proper emergency
planning, and effective response are crucial for the preven-
tion of natechs and mitigation of the consequences. Under
the conditions of a natural disaster, the limited resources, the
possible unavailability of mitigation measures, and the lack
of adequate communication complicate the management of
natechs. The analysis of past natechs is crucial for learning
lessons and for preventing or preparing for future natechs.
The 17 August 1999, Kocaeli earthquake, which was a dev-
astatingdisasterhittingoneofthemostindustrializedregions
of Turkey, offers opportunities in this respect. Among many
natechs that occurred due to the earthquake, the massive ﬁre
attheTUPRASIzmitreﬁneryandtheacrylonitrilespillatthe
AKSA acrylic ﬁber production plant were especially impor-
tant and highlight problems in the consideration of natechs in
emergency planning, response to industrial emergencies dur-
ing natural hazards, and information to the public during and
following the incidents. The analysis of these events shows
that even the largest and seemingly well-prepared facilities
can be vulnerable to natechs if risks are not considered ade-
quately.
1 Introduction
The Kocaeli earthquake on 17 August 1999 (Mw =7.4) was
one of the most devastating natural disasters in the modern
history of Turkey. Occurring at 03:02LT, the earthquake
caused about 17500 fatalities and 44000 injured, affected
15 million people, and resulted in total property damage of
over 15 billion USD. The area struck by the earthquake is
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one of the industrial heartlands of the country; it is densely
populated and heavily industrialized, accounting for 35% of
the gross national product (¨ Ozmen, 2000; Durukal and Erdik,
2008). The earthquake caused signiﬁcant structural dam-
age and machine and equipment loss at industrial facilities
(Johnson et al., 2000; Rahnama and Morrow, 2000; Suzuki,
2002; Sezen and Whittaker, 2006; Durukal and Erdik, 2008),
which led to many natech events ranging from small-sized
hazardous substance releases to enormous ﬁres (Steinberg et
al., 2001; Steinberg and Cruz, 2004).
Among these events, two were especially noteworthy due
to their extents and consequences: the massive ﬁre at the
TUPRAS Izmit reﬁnery in Korfez, Kocaeli and the acryloni-
trile spill at the AKSA acrylic ﬁber production plant in Cift-
likkoy, Yalova. The ﬁre at the reﬁnery lasted for 5 days and
could only be extinguished by international support (Danıs ¸
and G¨ org¨ un, 2005). The spill of 6500t of acrylonitrile (AN),
a toxic substance, damaged domestic animals, affected agri-
cultural activities, endangered public health, and resulted in
environmental pollution that required 5 years of continuous
treatment for reclamation (Bayer, 1999; Zanbak, 2008). Both
events required the evacuation of the settlements in the vicin-
ity of the facilities and hampered search and rescue opera-
tions. There were also considerable economical losses.
Despite their adverse consequences, these natech events
and their aftermath provide valuable information and lessons
for natech risk management and shed light on what should
and should not be done in case of such emergencies. In this
study, ﬁrst a detailed description of the events is given to
emphasize what went wrong, and then the recovery, restora-
tion and remediation work completed during the past decade
are reported. Moreover, weaknesses in response to and man-
agement of the events are discussed and recommendations
are made for better natech risk management. The presented
lessons learned from the case studies can be useful, not only
for Turkey but also for other natech-prone countries.
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2 TUPRAS Izmit reﬁnery ﬁre
Turkish Petroleum Reﬁneries Corp. (TUPRAS) was founded
in 1983 with the aim of uniting the administration and man-
agement of all public reﬁneries in Turkey. Initially it was
a state-owned corporation, but between 1991–2005 it was
gradually privatized. Currently, 51% of its shares belong
to the private sector and the remainder is on the stock ex-
change. Being Turkey’s only producer in the reﬁning sector
and its largest industrial corporation, TUPRAS operates 4 re-
ﬁneries in Izmit, Izmir, Kirikkale and Batman with crude-oil
processing capacities of 11.0, 11.0, 5.0 and 1.1 milliont/year,
respectively.
The TUPRAS Izmit reﬁnery located on the northern
coast of Izmit Bay at Korfez, Kocaeli, is the ﬂagship of
TUPRAS. It was founded in 1961 as a joint venture of
Turkish Petroleum Corp. (TPAO) and California Texas Oil
Corp. (CALTEX) under the name of Istanbul Petroleum Re-
ﬁnery Corp. (IPRAS). CALTEX shares were transferred to
TPAO in 1972 and all shares were transferred to TUPRAS in
1983. The initial crude-oil processing capacity of the reﬁn-
ery was 1.0 milliont/year, which was increased to 5.5 mil-
lion t/year in 1971 and 11.5 milliont/year in 1985 by two
major expansion projects. As of 2008, it processes 11.0 mil-
liont/year of crude-oil and holds 1.97 millionm3 crude oil
and product storage capacities. The reﬁnery is one of the
most enhanced reﬁneries in the Mediterranean region with a
Nelson complexity index (NCI) of 7.78 (TUPRAS, 2009).
NCI, which provides insight into reﬁnery complexity, re-
placement costs and the relative value addition ability, is 1.0
for crude distillation, about 5.0 for cracking reﬁneries, and
over 9.0 for coking reﬁneries (Reliance Industries, 2011).
The reﬁnery was the industrial facility that suffered the
most damage in the Kocaeli earthquake. Besides extensive
structural damage to processing, storage and utility units,
there were concurrent natech events at different parts of the
reﬁnery (Steinberg et al., 2001; G¨ org¨ un, 2007). The collapse
of a stack initiated a ﬁre at the crude-oil unit, while sparks
created by the bouncing of ﬂoating roofs ignited another ﬁre
at the naphtha tank farm. Fire ﬁghting activities were hin-
dered by the damage to the utilities and limited resources
due to the earthquake. The vicinity of the reﬁnery had to
be evacuated, which prevented search and rescue operations
from the debris. The ﬁre at the tank farm lasted for 5 days
and could only be extinguished with international response
efforts. Furthermore, the spill of oil products caused consid-
erable sea pollution.
A detailed description of the incident is presented in the
following sections, which are mainly based on ﬁrst hand
information obtained from HSE managers of the TUPRAS
Izmit reﬁnery during a site visit in April 2010. Interviewed
managers had been present in the reﬁnery during the natech
event and actively participated in the response and remedia-
tionactivities. Theinformationissupplementedbydatafrom
articles and technical reports, which are cited separately.
2.1 Description of the event
Shortly after the earthquake, ﬁres started simultaneously at
three different locations in the reﬁnery. All units of the re-
ﬁnery were shut down to prevent further damage. Electricity
was not available due to the failures in the national grid. The
water supply was interrupted because of extensive damage
to the pumping stations at the Sapanca Lake, from which all
water needs of the reﬁnery were met. The main water supply
pipelines were destroyed by the earthquake as well. Hence,
ﬁre ﬁghting activities were limited to on-site water storage,
which was about 36000m3. However, since the water stor-
age tanks were not covered, a signiﬁcant amount of water
was lost due to the sloshing effect of the earthquake. In the
absence of electricity, the water pumps could only be pow-
ered by diesel generators with considerably lower capacities.
Under these conditions, the ﬁre ﬁghting teams together with
all the personnel in the nightshift responded to the ﬁres.
The ﬁrst ﬁre, which started in the chemical warehouse
shortly after the earthquake, was of limited size. Materials
stored on the shelves fell down due to the strong ground mo-
tion, glass containers were broken, and contents were spread
onto the ground. The ﬁre, which was ignited either by sparks
or by exothermic chemical reactions, was extinguished in un-
der half an hour.
The second ﬁre started at the crude-oil processing plant
(Plant-25), which had been constructed in 1982 and had a
crude-oil processing capacity of 5 milliont/year. One of the
two stacks of the plant (Stack 25F-5), with a height of 115m
and a diameter of 10.5m, collapsed due to the earthquake.
One fragment fell over the furnace of the plant and caused
heavy damage. The other fragment fell over a pipe rack con-
necting the processing units to the storage tanks, breaking 63
product and utility pipes. The ﬁre, which started when the
highly ﬂammable substances found in the pipes ignited, was
extinguished in 4h before 07:30LT. However, the ﬁre ﬂared
up again at noon because of a continued fuel supply from
the broken pipes connected to the burning naphtha tanks in
the tank farm. Block valves were located close to the tanks
and hence inaccessible due to the ﬁre, which in turn made it
difﬁcult to control the fuel ﬂow (Johnson et al., 2000). Fire
ﬁghting efforts continued until the evening and the ﬁre was
extinguished completely at 18:15LT.
The third and the largest ﬁre occurred at the naphtha tank
farm, which is located approximately at the center of the
tank farm area of the reﬁnery. Four medium-sized ﬂoating
roof naphtha storage tanks were ignited following the earth-
quake by sparking due to the bouncing of the ﬂoating roofs
against the inner side of the tanks and subsequent metal-to-
metal contact between the metallic seals and the tank walls.
During the ﬁrst phase of the ﬁre, ﬁre ﬁghting teams were suc-
cessful in controlling the ﬂames with the limited resources
that had to be distributed between Plant-25 and the naphtha
tank farm ﬁres. As shown in Fig. 1a, which was taken 7h
after the start of the ﬁre, the ﬁres at two tanks (in the center,
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Fig. 1. The progress of the tank farm ﬁre after the ﬂange failure.
TK-241 (in the back) and TK-242) were completely extin-
guished and the remaining two (on the right, TK-202 (in the
back) and TK-203) were under control. Later on, the ﬂange
at the bottom of tank TK-202 failed, probably due to fatigue
caused by the excessive heat and structural deformation due
to the earthquake. Naphtha inside the tank started to ﬂow
outside through the ﬂange; this led to a jet ﬁre and ﬂames
covered the tanks. Roof ﬁres started again as can be seen
in Fig. 1b (t =11h). The ﬁre spread through an open ditch
to the tank farm located south towards the processing units
(Fig. 1c, t =15h). Eight tanks from this tank farm are visi-
ble in Fig. 1a behind TK-241 and TK-202 in a 2×4 arrange-
ment. In this section of the storage area, the ﬁrst two tanks
on the right (ﬁxed roof) and on the left (ﬂoating roof) were
storing heavy vacuum gas oil (HVGO) and heavy straight-
run naphtha (HSRN), respectively. Although affected on the
outside very badly by the ﬁre impingement, these tanks were
not ignited. But two small naphtha tanks (TK-221 (last) and
TK-222) located behind the HSRN tanks were engulfed by
the ﬂames and burned completely. The spreading of the ﬁre
is evident in Fig. 1d, which is oriented in a north-south direc-
tion from the right to the left.
Despite additional support provided by the military, the
municipalities and neighboring facilities, the ﬁre ﬁghting
teams lost control of the ﬁre due to the major conﬂagration
and had to retreat. Diesel pumps and the pumps of towing
boats were utilized to supply water from the sea, but the ef-
fort remained insufﬁcient. Lack of electricity and shortage
of foam hampered the response activities, as well. Forest ﬁre
and carrier airplanes responded to the ﬁre by throwing sea
water and foam on it from the air. However, they could not
effectively control the ﬁre since it was not possible to ﬂy low
enough to approach it. Being in a desperate situation, the ﬁre
ﬁghting operations were abandoned at 19:00LT (t = 16h).
An evacuation order was issued by the crisis center for a zone
of 5km around the reﬁnery and the government requested
international assistance. The next day, a barrier was con-
structed between the burning naphtha tank farm and the LPG
tanks to prevent the ﬁre from reaching that part of the reﬁn-
ery and causing a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion
(BLEVE), which occurs when a vessel containing a pressur-
ized liquid above its boiling point is ruptured, releasing the
contents explosively. The tanks were cooled both from the
air and the ground as well. National and international air-
craft, including helicopters, continued the ﬁre ﬁghting efforts
from the air. Meanwhile, electricity was restored to the water
pumps at Sapanca Lake and water started to be pumped to the
reﬁnery in the evening hours. In response to the international
aid request, a foam supply, ﬁre ﬁghting aircraft, ﬁre experts,
ﬁre ﬁghting vehicles and personnel were sent by several
countries. In particular, ﬁre ﬁghting teams from Azerbaijan
(10 ﬁreﬁghters specially trained for reﬁnery ﬁres), Bulgaria
(6 ﬁre ﬁghting vehicles and 30 staff members), and Germany
(portable water pumps and staff) participated actively in the
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ﬁghting of the ﬁre and their courage and efforts were highly
appreciated (Yeletaysı, 2007). On the third day, the ﬁre ﬁght-
ing activities accelerated when water from the main line be-
came available again. While foam spraying and cooling ac-
tivities were continued by the aircraft, an extensive counter-
attack involving all teams was organized on the ground from
all sides of the burning tanks. After serious efforts, the ﬁre
was put under control and all tanks except TK-242, which
was left to burn in a controlled manner, were extinguished
on 20 August. Consequently, force majeure status of the re-
ﬁnery was reduced to emergency level. The ﬁre at TK-242
was ﬁnally extinguished on the next day (G¨ org¨ un, 2007).
2.2 Consequences
Duetothecollapsedstackandthesubsequentﬁre, onecrude-
oil processing plant (Plant-25) and a pipe rack were heavily
damaged. Post-event examination and modeling studies re-
vealed that the collapse of the stack was not due to lack of
strength caused by design or material deﬁciencies but due to
the presence of reinforcing-bar splices in the region where
ﬂexural yielding occurred (Kilic and Sozen, 2003). Dur-
ing the massive naphtha tank farm ﬁre, 6 naphtha tanks and
30500t of the product were burned completely. Five addi-
tional storage tanks were heavily damaged by ﬁre impinge-
ment. One wooden cooling tower located close to the burned
naphtha tanks was burned as well (Danıs ¸ and G¨ org¨ un, 2005).
The ﬁre affected neither the crude oil, gasoline, and LPG
tanks of the reﬁnery, nor the ammonia storage tanks of the
fertilizer plant located next to the reﬁnery. Hence, no off-site
domino effect beyond the reﬁnery boundaries, which was in-
dicated as probable when the ﬁre was left unattended, hap-
pened. There were no fatalities or injuries during the ﬁre
ﬁghting. Train services connecting Ankara and Istanbul were
disrupted because of the ﬁre.
Besides the ﬁres, considerable structural damage occurred
to port facilities, storage tanks, cooling towers, and utility
lines, although no signiﬁcant ground failure occurred at the
reﬁnery during the earthquake except for some minimal liq-
uefaction of the reclaimed land. The majority of the ﬂoat-
ing roof tanks (30 out of 45) were damaged due to liquid
sloshing, resulting in 250000m3 crude oil and 100000m3
oil product having been exposed to the atmosphere and par-
tially pouring out of the tanks. The roofs of 5 crude-oil tanks
were completely submerged (G¨ org¨ un, 2007). The damaged
tanks were vulnerable to ﬁre due to ﬂammable vapors ris-
ing from the damaged roofs, but thankfully, such an accident
did not happen. Other failure modes observed at the tank
farm were cracking of tank roof-shell wall joints, bulging
of tank tops, and elephant-foot buckling (Steinberg et al.,
2001). Although the tanks were not anchored, no signiﬁ-
cant sliding was observed and hard piping performed well
(Sezen and Whittaker, 2006). The reinforced concrete bear-
ing columns of a 3000m3 capacity LPG tank were damaged.
One of the wooden cooling towers slid for 4m and collapsed
completely. Pipelines transporting crude oil from tankers to
the storage tanks and located at the shoreline fell from the
concrete embankment towards the seaside, but they did not
rupture. However, the loading and unloading jetty was dam-
aged heavily (Johnson et al., 2000).
Considerable oil pollution occurred during the incident.
Shortly after the earthquake, some oil spilled into the sea due
to fracturing of pipes and from an oil tanker that pulled away
from the loading jetty immediately (Johnson et al., 2000).
However, the main reason for the sea pollution were the ﬁre
ﬁghting efforts themselves. During the ﬁre ﬁghting opera-
tions, large quantities of oily water began to ﬂow out of the
embankments surrounding the tanks, spilled into the water
drainage system, ﬂooded the wastewater treatment plant, and
subsequently ﬂowed into the Izmit Bay. As an immediate
response and within 3h from the earthquake, barriers were
put into the sea. However, because priority had been given
to the ﬁres in the reﬁnery, an effective response could not be
achieved. On 20 August, a special response team from the
Oil Spill Response Limited (OSRL) arrived at the reﬁnery
to undertake oil spill response and clean-up activities. Over
500m3 oilwascollectedfromtheseparatorofthewastewater
treatment plant. About 400m3 emulsiﬁed oil that had been
reported at two harbours located west of the reﬁnery, Tavsan-
cil and Karamursel, was recovered during a 6-day clean-up
operation. An additional 32m3 material was recovered from
the beach adjacent to the reﬁnery (Harmer, 2001). Okay
et al. (2001) reported that polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon
(PAH) concentrations in the seawater, sediment and mussels
had increased in Izmit Bay after the incident. PAH concen-
trations in seawater both at offshore and coastal sites were
about 2µg/l in April 1999, but increased to 3.5–11µg/l and
5–17.5µg/latoffshoreandcoastalstations, respectively. Fur-
thermore, a two to three fold increase in sediment PAH con-
centrations was detected, especially around the reﬁnery.
The majority of the units, which were out of service due
to the earthquake and ﬁre damage, were put into operation
within less than 3 months after the earthquake when the re-
ﬁnery became functional again. Following about 200 main-
tenance and restoration works, which were completed earlier
than planned, all units were operational after one year. Dur-
ing the restoration period the demand for oil products was
met by additional import and increased production capaci-
ties of other reﬁneries including the ATAS reﬁnery in Mersin,
which was the only reﬁnery not belonging to TUPRAS at
that time. It was converted into a storage facility in 2004.
The total cost of restoration, including the oil spill clean-up,
was 57.8 million USD, which is half of the initial estimate
of 115.0 million USD. 95% of this loss was covered by the
insurance (Danıs ¸ and G¨ org¨ un, 2005). The operational loss of
the reﬁnery can be seen in Fig. 2, which shows the amount
of crude-oil processed by TUPRAS reﬁneries between 1996–
2003. The reﬁnery’s loss of production due to the earthquake
is evident from the sharp decrease in the processing, while
theotherreﬁnerieshaveasteadytrend. Bytakingtheaverage
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Fig. 2. Yearly distribution of crude-oil processed by TUPRAS re-
ﬁneries.
of crude-oil processing values before 1999 and after 2000,
the expected crude-oil processing value if the natech would
not have happened is found to be 9.1 milliont/year. Based on
this value, the total loss of crude-oil processing capacity of
the reﬁnery is 4.6 milliont during the recovery period. This
value is roughly equivalent to 6 months of production loss
and conﬁrms the initial estimate for the operational losses
made just after the earthquake (H¨ urriyet, 1999c).
2.3 Restoration and follow-up
TUPRAS was criticized for not being sufﬁciently prepared
for such a natech event, although it was known that the re-
ﬁnery is located in a high earthquake risk area. The criti-
cism mainly focused on the lack of foaming systems on the
tanks, inadequate diesel pumps, the limited application of
sprinkler systems, non-interoperable ﬁrewater connections,
insufﬁcient containment ponds, the lack of ﬁre ﬁghting tow-
ers, and deﬁciencies in the coordination and management of
the ﬁre ﬁghting activities (Kılıc ¸, 1999).
In fact, the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake was not the ﬁrst time
for the reﬁnery to experience an earthquake-triggered nat-
ech. After the 1967 Mudurnu Valley earthquake (22 July
1967, Ms = 7.1), a major ﬁre was ignited in the crude-oil
processing unit and was extinguished by the reﬁnery person-
nel (Bortac ¸ina, 1999). The epicenter of the 1967 Mudurnu
Valley earthquake was near Akyazi about 80km east of the
reﬁnery and had an intensity of MCS VIII–IX (Ambraseys,
1968). Since the reﬁnery was located far away from the epi-
center and operating at its initial capacity, damage was lim-
ited and it is quite likely that the experience was forgotten in
over 30 years from then until 1999.
The seismicity and the earthquake risk of the reﬁnery were
assessed in a study in 1976, before the second major expan-
sion. Based on the average annual occurrence curve of the
earthquakes in the vicinity of Izmit, the return period of a
7.5-magnitude earthquake was found to be 125 years. As-
Fig. 3. Retroﬁtting on the naphtha tank TK-202 burned during the
ﬁre.
suming the lifetime of the tanks to be constructed in the tank
farm as 50 years, the expected maximum earthquake mag-
nitude was calculated as 6.5–7.0. The duration of a prob-
able earthquake was estimated as 20–25s and no liquefac-
tion or ground collapse were expected (Danıs ¸ and G¨ org¨ un,
2005). The 1999 Kocaeli earthquake showed that these es-
timates were not accurate. The overall seismic risks of the
TUPRAS reﬁneries were re-assessed by detailed ﬁeld inves-
tigations and the structural analysis of critical components
and structures, such as storage tanks, stacks, chimneys and
frame structures. Seismically vulnerable components were
identiﬁed and proactive seismic upgrades were applied to
reduce the risk. Emergency response plans were reviewed;
ﬁreandoil-spillﬁghtingcapacitieswereincreaseddrastically
(G¨ org¨ un, 2007).
The burned naphtha tanks were ﬂoating-roof tanks with
a single line of sprinklers at the top. They were recon-
structed in the form of internal ﬂoating-roof tanks with ad-
vanced sprinkler systems around and over the tanks. Wa-
ter cannons and foaming systems having in-situ foam stocks
were installed next to each tank. The number of ﬁre ﬁghting
hydrants was increased and converters were provided to im-
provetheinteroperabilityofinternalandexternalﬁreﬁghting
equipment. Embankments around the tanks were reinforced
to prevent leakage to other sites in case of overﬂow. Im-
provements made at the tanks are illustrated in Fig. 3, where
the retroﬁtted TK-202 is shown. Compared to the old tank
shown in Fig. 1a, signiﬁcant progress is evident. The re-
silienceoftheothertanksinthetankfarmwasalsoimproved,
although not to the same level as the naphtha tanks. Sprinkler
systems were upgraded and foaming systems were imple-
mented. Fifty ﬁxed and 10 portable water cannons were in-
stalled. ThebearingcolumnsofsphericalLPGtankswerere-
inforced. Gas and ﬂame detectors were installed at the tanks
and in the processing units. The water capacity for ﬁre ﬁght-
ing was increased 5 fold and the ﬁre water network within
the reﬁnery was enhanced. In order to make use of the sea
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Table 1. Selected safety and ﬁre ﬁghting system improvements at the reﬁnery.
Problem Precautionary measure
Insufﬁcient preparedness for natechs Revised emergency response plan taking natechs into consideration
Inadequate response to the natechs Disaster management plan with scenarios:
– Fire events at four different locations
– Fire at the largest storage tank with minimal water supply
Deﬁciencies in coordination and man-
agement of response activities
Bimonthly emergency response practices based on probable scenarios including
natechs with participation of all reﬁnery personnel
Inadequate ﬁre water supply Increased ﬁre water capacity (5 folds)
Ineffective use of sea water Portable diesel water pump (900m3/h), monitor and 600 hose (2km)
Sea water connection to ﬁre water system
Lack of sprinkler and foaming systems Water sprinkler and foaming systems at all tanks
Gas and ﬂame sensors
Insufﬁcient ﬁre ﬁghting equipment Upgrade of the ﬁre water network
Upgrade of ﬁre ﬁghting vehicles
Water canons (50 ﬁxed and 10 portable)
Insufﬁcient oil spill response Increased oil barrier stock (3km)
OSRL membership
water more efﬁciently, powerful portable diesel pumps were
added to the inventory. Hoses of sufﬁcient length to reach the
units and the storage tanks located in distant parts of the re-
ﬁnery were supplied. Buildings were retroﬁtted according to
the 1998 Turkish speciﬁcations for structures built in disas-
ter areas, which include modern earthquake provisions (Of-
ﬁcial Journal, 1998). On the management level, safety and
ﬁre ﬁghting standards were improved. Based on the lessons
learned during the management and coordination of the re-
sponse activities, a disaster management plan was prepared
in 2000 to improve the efﬁciency in ﬁrst response and the
mitigation of consequences. The current disaster manage-
ment plan considers two natech scenarios. In the ﬁrst sce-
nario, a ﬁre in one of the largest storage tanks, about 135m
in diameter and located at a remote site, is speculated to have
limited ﬁre ﬁghting water resources. The second scenario
is based on 4 ﬁres ignited concurrently at different locations
within the reﬁnery. Finally, a membership agreement was
signed with OSRL for quick response to oil spills, both on
land and offshore (G¨ org¨ un, 2007). A summary of the mea-
sures applied at the reﬁnery after the Kocaeli earthquake is
given in Table 1 together with the reasons for these actions.
3 AKSA acrylonitrile spill
Aksa Acrylic Chemical Industry Corp. (AKSA) is an acrylic
ﬁber production facility located on the southern coast of
the Izmit Bay, 20km west of Yalova. Constructed in
1968, the facility had an initial production capacity of
5000t/year in 1971, which was gradually increased and
reached 230000t/year in 1999 and 308000t/year in 2008.
Currently it is the only producer in Turkey and the largest
in the world with a global market share of 12.5% (AKSA,
2009).
For the production of acrylic ﬁber, acrylonitrile (AN) is
used as the raw material and is stored in large quantities at
the facility. AN (CAS: 107-13-1) is a hazardous chemical
that is highly ﬂammable, toxic, hazardous to aquatic environ-
ment, and may cause cancer (European Union, 2008). The
International Agency for Research on Cancer classiﬁes it as
possibly carcinogenic to humans with sufﬁcient evidence for
carcinogenicity in experimental animals (IARC, 1999).
The earthquake damaged three of the storage tanks at
AKSA and caused about 6500t of AN to be released into
air, sea and groundwater. All animals and vegetation died
inside the facility within a 200m radius around the tanks.
Acute toxicity symptoms were observed in the emergency
response teams and the public living in the vicinity. Accord-
ing to Voice of Yalova (2010), there is an alleged increase in
the cancer rate due to the event.
3.1 Description of the event
Out of six acrylonitrile storage tanks located in the facility,
onewasemptyandtheremainingﬁvewerepartiallyﬁlledbe-
fore the earthquake. Three of the ﬁlled tanks were damaged.
Ononetanktheroofruptured, whereastheothertwosuffered
pipe breaking at their base. Approximately 6500t of AN was
releasedintotheconcretecontainmentdikesaroundthetanks
with base damage and to the atmosphere from the tank with
roof damage. A signiﬁcant amount of the spilled liquid AN
overﬂowed from the containment dikes and was lost into the
sea as surface runoff through the drainage channel. A portion
of the remaining AN evaporated into the atmosphere. Due to
the cracks created by the earthquake at the bottom of the con-
crete containment dikes, a considerable amount of the AN
leaked into the soil and subsequently reached the underlying
shallow coastal aquifer at the site (S ¸eng¨ or, 2002).
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Electricity was not available and all water pipes, including
the ones used for ﬁre ﬁghting, were broken, causing 400t of
water in the water storage tank to ﬂow into the sea (Bayer,
1999). The vapor suppression system installed to contain
accidental spills could not be operated properly due to the
loss of water pressure. The emergency generator of the plant,
which was located close to the storage tanks, could not be op-
erated since it was not explosion proof and the concentration
of highly ﬂammable AN was very high in the air (Steinberg
and Cruz, 2004). Hence, special foam to prevent the evap-
oration of AN had to be applied manually during the initial
response. Once the generator was moved to a safe distance,
it was used to pump sea water for foam generation.
Around 13:30LT, the crisis center of Yalova was informed
about the spill. The general manager of the facility urgently
requested special foam, sprays, pumps, and gas mask ﬁl-
ters, which were insufﬁcient in the facility, and he stated that
an area of 6km radius around the facility should be evacu-
ated due to the risk to the public health. Although there was
awareness that the rescue operations would be hampered, the
evacuation order was inevitably issued by the crisis center
considering the seriousness of the situation. Since there were
no means of telecommunication, the public was informed
personally by the local security forces, and settlements were
started to be evacuated from 15:00LT on (Ekim, 2003). Also
towns which were more than 10km away from the facility
were reportedly evacuated (Kaplan, 1999).
In reply to an external support request, the ﬁre ﬁghting
team of the nearby military airport joined the mitigation op-
erations. Fire brigades of nearby municipalities and Istanbul
supplied foam and pumps, but did not join onsite activities
because the working environment was highly toxic and pro-
tective measures, such as gas masks and airtight suits, were
lacking (S ¸enocaklı, 2003a). Barriers were constructed to pre-
vent surface runoff of the AN to the sea. After the electricity
was recovered at t =36h, AN was started to be transferred
from the containment dikes into intact tanks and the wastew-
ater treatment pond. About 3000t of AN were reported to
have been collected in this way (S ¸eng¨ or, 2002). Emergency
response activities continued for more than one week until
all spilled material was transferred to safe tanks and evapo-
ration was prevented. During the transfer operation, atmo-
spheric AN concentrations of 360ppm were measured in the
vicinity of the pump and 10–30ppm at other locations within
the facility (Supreme Court, 2004).
3.2 Consequences
Despite AN being highly ﬂammable, no ﬁre occurred during
the incident. During the initial response, 27 workers were re-
ported to have been poisoned (H¨ urriyet, 1999b). One mem-
ber of the military ﬁre ﬁghting team reportedly went into a
coma, while the others were affected badly (Supreme Court,
2004). All the animals located in the zoological garden of
the facility and vegetation, including plants and pine trees,
died within 200m distance from the leaking storage tanks.
Birds and domestic animals were also reported to have died
in the settlements close to the facility (Kaplan, 1999). Many
ﬁsh kills were reported due to the AN spilled into Izmit
Bay through the drainage channel (T¨ urk, 1999). The mea-
surements conducted at three sampling stations close to the
facility showed that AN concentration in the seawater was
0.157–2.88µg/l 10 days after the incident, which decreased
to 0.075–0.178µg/l after 25 days. Acrylamide, which is a hy-
drolysis product of AN in the aquatic environment, was also
found in the samples (G¨ uven and Gezgin, 2005). Acrylamide
(CAS: 79-06-1) is known to be toxic, carcinogenic, muta-
genic, and toxic for reproduction (European Union, 2008).
Inhabitants of settlements in the vicinity of the facility suf-
fered symptoms of acute toxicity, such as hoarseness, ver-
tigo, nausea, respiratory problems, skin irritation, headache,
eye and nasal irritation (S ¸enocaklı, 2003b; Aydemir, 2010b).
These health problems also hampered search and rescue op-
erations, which were mainly conducted by the local people
due to lack of professional search and rescue teams. Follow-
ing the evacuation order, the settlements were started to be
evacuated, but exposures up to 20h were reported (Aydemir,
2010b). Due to the natural hazard conditions, the local hos-
pitals and clinics were overcrowded with seriously injured
people. Hence, they were not able to respond properly to the
poisoned people and treat the symptoms adequately (H¨ urtas ¸,
1999). Lack of communication also prevented health ofﬁ-
cials from receiving information about the properties of AN
and treatment methods of its toxic effects from the experts of
the facility. A public health survey conducted by the Istanbul
Chamber of Medicine two months after the incident and cov-
ering 149 residents of the closest settlements to the facility,
namely Altinkum, Basak and Taskopru, revealed that acute
toxicity effects were observed in the majority of the survey
participants from Altinkum (Fig. 4). Toxicity effects were
observed to a lesser extent among the residents of Basak and
Taskopru with increasing distance to the facility (Emiroˇ glu
et al., 2000). Altinkum is located 650m NW of the tank
farm, within the 1200m health protection zone of the facil-
ity, whereas Basak and Taskopru are situated about 2 and
2.5km SW, respectively. Long-term health statistics are not
available, hence the long-term health impacts are not known.
But it was reported that among the 189 people who prose-
cuted the company after the incident, 17 had died from can-
cer and 5 additional are being treated for cancer (Aydemir,
2010a). Among the 5 members of the military ﬁre ﬁghting
team, which responded to the spill in the ﬁrst days of the in-
cident, one reportedly died of lung cancer and another one is
being treated for it (H¨ urtas ¸, 2009).
After they had been informed that the danger had been
passed, evacuees returned to their villages from 24 August
onwards. Agricultural activities were resumed in the farms
located around the facility. It was reported that the harvested
products, which were contaminated with AN, were put on
the market and sent as far as Istanbul for a couple of days
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Fig. 4. The distribution of the symptoms of toxic exposure by set-
tlements.
until a ban was issued by the local government (Kaplan,
1999). After the ban, the produce of the farms located close
to the plant was collected and subsequently destroyed. Pro-
duction losses were reimbursed by the company, which was
afterwards compensated by its insurance (S ¸enocaklı, 2003c;
Supreme Court, 2004).
3.3 Restoration and follow-up
An extensive ground water pump-and-treat system for hy-
draulic control and product recovery was initiated after the
incident. Eleven monitoring wells were constructed in or-
der to determine the extent of groundwater pollution. Uti-
lizing 5 additionally existing boreholes, AN concentration,
pH, electrical conductivity and groundwater level measure-
ments were started at 16 locations within the facility area
in September 1999. Based on monitoring data, two pump-
ing wells were installed inside the damaged tank dike and
four French drain-type drainage trenches were gradually put
into operation around the tank farm (S ¸eng¨ or, 2002). Dur-
ing the ﬁrst year of the operation, the extracted ground wa-
ter was treated by an on-site distillation unit and over 80t
of AN were recovered (Parametrix, 2002). Afterwards the
groundwater was treated in the wastewater treatment plant
of the facility to recover the low levels of AN, which could
not be efﬁciently recovered by distillation. In order to opti-
mize this clean-up performance, the groundwater extraction
scheme was continuously altered by switching pumping on
and off at different pumps and drainage trenches according
to measurements of the AN concentration, groundwater level
and rainfall. At the end of the third year, the AN concen-
tration had decreased from its initial level of >80000mg/l
to non-detectable levels and stabilized. The pump-and-treat
operation was continued for ﬁve years, resulting in the treat-
ment of 53000m3 of groundwater. Monitoring studies were
maintained for two more years until September 2006 (Zan-
bak, 2008).
As part of the restoration work, all storage tanks were
strengthened against sloshing effects and secondary roofs
were constructed to minimize evaporation in case of a leak.
Hard piping connections to the storage tanks were replaced
with ﬂexible connections (Ekimci, 2000). The ground of the
containment dikes was covered with impermeable material
andthedikes werereinforced. Foamingsprayswereinstalled
around the tanks. Underground water pipes that were bro-
ken during the earthquake were installed over ground. The
capacity of emergency power generators was increased and
additional pumps were installed. Emergency response plans
were reviewed and improved by taking natech scenarios into
account.
The company was prosecuted by about 200 people and
over 40 lawsuits were ﬁled both for punishment and compen-
sation. The suits of punishment for the harm to human health
and the environment were annulled in 2003, because of the
death of the general manager of the facility who claimed re-
sponsibility in the name of the company. The suits of com-
pensation continued for 9 years. The local civil court decided
in favor of the defendant several times, but the judgments
were reversed on appeal by the supreme court (Zaman, 2005;
Sabah, 2006). In the end, the company was ﬁned for mone-
tary compensation. As of 2010, the trials are still continuing
at the European Court of Human Rights (Aydemir, 2010a).
4 Discussions
Both the TUPRAS and AKSA incidents show that the loss
of electricity and an insufﬁcient water supply were important
factors aggravating the natech events during the earthquake.
In fact, the ﬁre ﬁghting and emergency response infrastruc-
tures were designed and built under the assumption of robust
power and material supply, relying on external (e.g. national
interconnected network) or internal (e.g. power regeneration
plant) resources. Both types of resources failed during the
earthquake and are likely to fail during natural hazards. An
extensive study in the region performed by Steinberg and
Cruz (2004) showed that the most common failures at 19
visited industrial facilities affected by the earthquake were
loss of electricity, loss of water or water pressure, and lack
of personnel (in all visited facilities), followed by structural
damage (95%), rupture of pipes and connections (63%), and
liquid sloshing (58%). The analysis of the failures leading
to or affecting the response to natech events reveals that the
most signiﬁcant factors are loss of electricity (74%), liquid
sloshing (47%), and loss of water or water pressure (37%).
Hence, damage to utilities is a general and major problem
during earthquake-triggered natechs.
Although emergency and back-up systems for electricity
and water supply were available at TUPRAS and AKSA,
they were inadequate to meet the needs of the emergency re-
sponse activities. This situation was recognized at the high-
est level of administration and the general managers of the
facilities admitted that they had not been prepared for the
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earthquake and the associated natech events (Bayer, 1999).
Actually, the facilities did have environmental and health and
safety management systems, and were known to be com-
plying with national environmental and occupational health
and safety regulations. Emergency response and mitigation
plans were in force before the earthquake and the associated
equipment and human resources were available. However,
the facilities’ emergency response performance was deﬁcient
because they were prepared for incidents expected to occur
during the normal operation of the facilities. Natechs had not
been taken into consideration while plans were prepared.
Consideringnatechhazardsforplanningpurposesrequires
the development of credible natech scenarios which is not a
simple task. A typical emergency response scenario is gen-
erally based on a single event deemed to be worst-case and
it assumes the existence of sufﬁcient response capacity. In
complex scenarios, domino effects are considered and some
response or mitigation measures are presumed to be unavail-
able. Such plans result in the allocation of additional re-
sponse capacity, increased self-sufﬁciency, and backup mit-
igation systems. However, realistic natech scenarios require
concurrent multiple events to be considered under disaster
conditions, whereby the majority of mitigation measures are
lacking. As the number of simultaneous events increases
and the availability of the response capabilities decreases,
the scenarios become more and more difﬁcult to cope with
and require serious emergency-response investment. Clearly,
it is not reasonable and also possible to backup every util-
ity and keep ﬁre ﬁghting material sufﬁcient to extinguish a
conﬂagration of the whole facility in stock. For industry,
it is important to balance the level of safety and its cost.
Large industrial facilities, like TUPRAS or AKSA, are ca-
pable of covering the cost of a high level of safety and in
fact, they did invest signiﬁcantly in natech preparedness af-
ter the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake, as explained in the preced-
ing sections. However, many industrial facilities prone to
natechs, especially SMEs, have only limited resources that
can be allocated for this purpose. In this respect, the de-
velopment of credible, as well as applicable natech scenar-
ios is very important. Scientiﬁc studies are rare and there is
a lack of methodologies and guidelines on this topic, hence
further action is required (Krausmann, 2010; Krausmann and
Baranzini, 2009).
Emergency response plans that consider natech hazards
should also be reviewed and updated periodically to take into
account recent natural-hazard information and the status of
the facility. It is common practice in the industry to con-
struct a facility with a limited initial capacity and expand it
in the following years according to the proﬁt and market de-
mand. This is especially the case in developing countries,
where the investment resources are limited and the market
is risky. The production capacity of the TUPRAS Izmit re-
ﬁnery increased 11 fold in the ﬁrst 25 years and since then,
the processing units are renovated periodically. The increase
in the production capacity of AKSA is more than 60-fold
in 40 years. Clearly, the emergency response capabilities
of the facilities should be sustained and upgraded in line
with the growth, and this includes safety management sys-
tems, human resources, training, and equipment. Besides the
changes in the facilities, changes in the natural hazard risks
should also be considered appropriately. During the lifetime
of a facility, the natural hazard risks can vary drastically.
An earthquake that would happen on a fault line could in-
ﬂuence the earthquake occurrence probabilities all along the
fault zone. Severe meteorological and hydro-meteorological
natural hazards are predicted to increase with global climate
change (van Aalst, 2006; IPCC, 2007); thus, their risk is also
increasing. Such changes should be considered in natech risk
management.
As is the case in many other countries, the existence of
settlements close to industrial facilities increases the risk of
natechs. In Turkey, industrial facilities posing considerable
health and safety risks are required to be located distant from
settlements by law since 1930 (Ofﬁcial Journal, 1930). Sev-
eral regulations have been published to date to list such in-
dustrial activities and arrange provisions required for permit
procedures. According to these regulations, health protection
zones, where settlements are forbidden, should be designated
around the hazardous installations. The size of a health pro-
tection zone is designated case by case by a local commit-
tee composed of administrative and technical staff. Munici-
pal plans controlling development and settlement have been
relied on for the maintenance of the designated zones. Al-
though the regulations were in force before the start of the in-
dustrialization period of the country in the late 1960s, appro-
priate safety distances do not always exist between the set-
tlements and the industrial facilities as in the case of AKSA.
AKSAhasahealthprotectionzoneof1200m. Thiszonewas
designated 20 years following the construction of the facility
and there were housings and farms within the zone, which
were built before this date (Kaplan, 1999; Supreme Court,
2004). After the designation of the zone, no additional de-
velopment was allowed within the zone, but existing build-
ings remained as is and continued to be inhabited. These set-
tlements and farms were affected intensively by the natech
event.
In the TUPRAS case, the proximity of other industrial fa-
cilities storing hazardous substances to the reﬁnery increased
the risk of domino effects and affected the response activi-
ties. One of the reasons for evacuating when the conﬂagra-
tion in the naphtha tank farm went out of control, was the
fear of the explosion of the ammonia storage tanks of the
fertilizer plant located next to the reﬁnery, which, if it had
happened, would have been a catastrophe (H¨ urriyet, 1999a).
On the other hand, the staff of the fertilizer plant had to evac-
uate their facility and before leaving, they opened the valves
on the refrigerated ammonia tanks to prevent an intolerable
build-up of pressure in the tanks as the ammonia warmed.
This resulted in a considerable amount of ammonia being
released into the environment (Steinberg et al., 2001).
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Both the AKSA and TUPRAS incidents highlight the im-
portance of land use planning in mitigating natech conse-
quences. For Turkey, inadequate health protection zones ex-
ist mainly due to various shortcomings in the development
and enforcement of land use plans and this is partly a con-
sequence of deﬁciencies in regulations. Upgrades in the ex-
isting facilities and the corresponding need for an increase in
health protection zone distances have not been properly ad-
dressed in the regulations. In addition, it was unclear what
should be done with illegal housing that was built within the
zones after the construction of the facility. The most recent
regulation published in 2005 aims to solve this problem by
requiring the land within health protection zones to be owned
by the industrial facilities (Ofﬁcial Journal, 2005). However
problems with existing facilities seem to persist. The devel-
opment of guidelines for the designation of health protection
zones that take natechs into account is also important for sup-
porting local technical committees in deﬁning safe and stan-
dardized protection zones in a scientiﬁc manner.
In both the TUPRAS and AKSA incidents, the natech
events resulted in the evacuation of nearby towns and ham-
pered rescue activities. Evacuation seems to be inevitable in
the case of major natechs, where the risk to the public and the
ﬁrst responders outweighs reaching the potential survivors
still buried under the debris in a timely manner. However,
limited awareness, misinformation, and inadequate commu-
nication through unofﬁcial channels together with chaotic
conditions due to the natural disaster may lead to the evac-
uation of areas where it would actually not be needed. In
both natech incidents, settlements much further then the ofﬁ-
cially announced evacuation distances were evacuated by the
public, due to limited information and the growing fear. In
order to prevent this, evacuation plans should be prepared for
natech-prone areas that take natech scenarios and their prob-
able consequences into consideration. These plans should be
practiced by the authorities and the public.
On the other hand, rescue operations may result in pro-
longed exposure of ﬁrst responders and the public to haz-
ardous substances, which may have adverse effects in the
long term. In the AKSA incident, the acute toxicity effects
of AN were noticed by the people living in the vicinity al-
ready shortly after the releases occurred. However, because
there were survivors under the debris who were relatives and
close friends, the people did not leave the place and contin-
ued rescue operations until the symptoms became too seri-
ous (S ¸enocaklı, 2003b; Aydemir, 2010b). During this period
the evacuation order was not issued yet, hence people in the
affected zones were not forced to leave their places. This sit-
uation is likely to occur for similar natechs involving toxic
substances with acute and chronic health hazards. The pub-
lic living in the vicinity of natech prone facilities should be
informed about the properties of the hazardous substances
stored or processed at the facility, their health impacts, the
symptoms of the various toxicity levels, how to mitigate
these symptoms and the duration of exposure deemed safe
and during which the rescue operations could be continued.
Prolonged exposure may be inevitable, but at least individu-
als can make an informed decision on how to act.
Although the majority of the hazardous industrial facilities
has well-trained medical units to respond to emergencies, in
the case of off-site consequences local hospitals and clinics
have to treat people affected by hazardous substances. As it
became apparent from the problems in the AKSA case, prior
knowledge of the names and properties of substances, as well
as of the symptoms of toxic exposure and the corresponding
treatment methods may play an important role during the ini-
tial phases of the response activities. This is especially the
case for natechs, in which there are many other hospitalized
people taking precedence, human and treatment resources
are limited, and communication is inadequate. Local medical
services should be informed about the risks at industrial fa-
cilities and have adequate and appropriate medicine in stock
for treating exposure to hazardous substances. Similar to the
medical units, local security forces, such as the gendarmerie
and military, play an important role during emergencies. In
both the TUPRAS and AKSA incidents, they participated ac-
tively in the emergency response activities. Moreover, they
were in charge of informing and assisting the public during
the evacuation, and of securing the evacuation zones. There-
fore, they were also exposed to the hazardous effects of nate-
chs, although they are not professionals in the ﬁeld and there-
fore have limited information about the risks. Proper train-
ing of local security units in the vicinity of natech-prone in-
dustrial facilities could be very beneﬁcial for efﬁcient natech
emergency management.
5 Conclusions
The 1999 Kocaeli earthquake was the most destructive natu-
ral hazard that has happened in Turkey in the last decades.
Besides enormous property damage and human losses, its
effects on the economy and industry were also devastating
since it occurred in one of the most industrialized regions of
the country. Many industrial facilities had to cope with not
only the structural damage, but also with secondary natech
events triggered by the earthquake. The massive ﬁre at the
TUPRAS Izmit reﬁnery and the hazardous AN spill at the
AKSA acrylic ﬁber production plant were two natech events
that attracted special interest due to their extent and con-
sequences. As described in detail in this study, signiﬁcant
lessons can be learned from these events, which may subse-
quently lead to the proper consideration of natural hazards in
emergency-response planning activities, the reduction of de-
ﬁciencies in emergency management practices, and strength-
ening of design and construction standards at industrial fa-
cilities dealing with hazardous substances in natural-hazard
prone areas.
As shown for the TUPRAS and AKSA cases, the pre-
paredness of industrial facilities for natech events is currently
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high in facilities that have recently experienced natechs.
However, natech preparedness is low in the majority of facil-
ities, mainly due to economical reasons and because of regu-
lations that do not sufﬁciently address natech hazards. Laws
and regulation on land use planning, occupational health and
safety, ﬁre protection, and environmental protection have
been in force for several decades. Nonetheless, they are not
sufﬁcient for proper preparedness for and response to the nat-
echevents. TheTurkishemergencyanddisastermanagement
framework was recently restructured and the context was ex-
panded to include natechs. But the framework still focuses
on natural disasters, mainly earthquakes, and natechs are not
addressed properly (Girgin, 2010). In order to control major
industrial accidents, a new regulation based on the 96/82/EC
(Seveso II) Directive of the European Union, was put into
practice in 2010 (Ofﬁcial Journal, 2010). This is an impor-
tant step, since prevention of and preparedness for industrial
accidents forms the basis of natech risk management. How-
ever, the location of high-risk industrial facilities is currently
not known in detail and the data required for risk assessment
are lacking. Moreover, the information on natural hazards
is limited for many natural hazard types as well. Method-
ologies for rapid regional natech risk assessment would be
useful to determine baseline conditions.
As presented in this study, Turkey experienced serious nat-
ech events during the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake. There is also
concern about future natechs due to the elevated natural haz-
ard risks of the country. The expected probability of occur-
rence of a major earthquake in Istanbul, which is the indus-
trial capital of the country with more than 12 million inhab-
itants, is high. Therefore, the risk of accompanying natechs
which aggravate the damage due to the earthquake is not neg-
ligible. According to a recent probabilistic model, the prob-
ability of a M ≥7 earthquake rupturing beneath the Sea of
Marmara is 53±18% (35–70%) for the period of 2004–2034
(Parsons, 2004). The current disaster prevention/mitigation
plan for Istanbul considers a scenario in line with this model
as the most probable scenario. According to this scenario,
for a model earthquake of Mw =7.5, the estimated number
of deaths and severely injured is 73000 and 120000, respec-
tively, which is almost 4 times higher than that of the 1999
Kocaeli earthquake (JICA, 2002). Although natech hazards
are still little known due to a lack of awareness, distribution
of industrial facilities in Istanbul with respect to earthquake
hazard zones shows that many facilities are located in high-
intensity zones (Durukal et al., 2008). Detailed natech risk
analysis and mapping studies based on realistic natech sce-
narios are required to be able to assess the natech risk for
this area and the possible consequences in the case of an
earthquake. The level of preparedness for natechs in industry
should also be assessed.
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